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1Procedural justice in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Fairness judgments among users 
of Financial Ombudsman services in Germany and the United Kingdom
 
BEN BRADFORD and NAOMI CREUTZFELDT1
Abstract 
This article uses the lens of procedural justice theory to explore peoples’ experiences 
of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) model: ombudsman services, focussing on two 
services that deal with complaints about financial services in Germany and the UK. We ask 
two key questions: is the complaints process more important than its outcome; and does the 
importance of process and outcome vary between countries? In both countries we find a 
strong association between perceptions of procedural justice and outcomes such as overall 
perceptions of fairness, confidence in the ombudsman service, and decision acceptance. 
Against expectations, these associations are broadly invariant across the German and UK 
samples; but, despite this, all else equal German respondents expressed consistently more 
positive views. Our data add some nuance to the existing literature on procedural justice and 
suggest that the national context also plays a role. We suggest that national legal cultures 
provide for a framework of rules that guide people’s perceptions and behaviours in legal, 
quasi-legal and related environments.
INTRODUCTION
Ombudsman services are a well-established model offering alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR). Swedish in origin, the ombudsman model has evolved over time and taken on many 
different forms.2 Originally providing a service of accountability for citizens in relation to 
state institutions, ombudsmen can now be found providing ADR in the private sector 
(transport, telecommunications, energy, financial services, for example) as well as the public 
sector.3 Ombudsman services provide a way of resolving disputes that does not involve 
recourse to formal legal processes, which may be lengthy, expensive and often out of the 
reach of many ordinary citizens. 
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2European legislation on consumer ADR (2013/11/EU) has made the availability of 
ADR providers redressing consumer complaints mandatory in all EU member states. This has 
produced a rapid expansion of ombudsman services throughout Europe. Thus far this 
expansion has not been matched by empirical studies exploring what users think of these 
bodies. This paper aims to address this omission. We seek to understand how the users of the 
ombudsman model experience the process, and whether the ways in which judgments are 
formed vary across users of similar services in two different jurisdictions, Germany and the 
UK. We ask, what shapes service-user’s willingness to accept decisions: is the process more 
important than the outcome; and does the relative importance of process and outcome vary 
across countries? 
Why does this matter? Little is known about users’ expectations and perceptions of 
ADR providers. Whilst legislation has been implemented4 in EU member states, it is 
important to understand what users of the system experience, which can be fed back into the 
dispute resolution process design to provide the most effective and accepted pathway to 
redress for consumers.
The ombudsmen we discuss in our paper provide ADR for consumers who have 
unresolved disputes with financial service providers. Our focus is on Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS), in the UK, and the Versicherungsombudsmann (VO), in Germany. Both are 
regulated through the national transposition of the EU consumer ADR directive. The FOS 
was set up in 2001 by law as an independent public body that aims to resolve individual 
disputes between consumers and financial service providers. The process is free of charge for 
the consumer. In the words of the ombudsman herself, the process aims at fairness, which 
“isn’t only about making sure our answers and decisions are technically right. It’s also about 
wanting to make what we do feel right. And we do this by listening, thinking and 
explaining.”5 The FOS has legal powers to provide redress when it decides that someone has 
been treated unfairly. In 2015/2016 it received 219,996 new complaints about insurances – 
including payment protection insurance (PPI). This was slightly lower than the previous year 
and represented 65 per cent of all new complaints received by the FOS. The primary issue 
resulting in complaints remains the quality of communication between insurers and their 
customers. 
The VO6 is an independent and accredited ADR provider that is free of charge for the 
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3consumer, and was set up in 2001. The VO helps consumers navigate and understand disputes 
resulting out of complex insurance contracts. Unlike the FOS it was set up by German 
insurance companies for two reasons: first to protect consumers, and second to prevent 
disputes with their customers being brought to a court. In 2015 the VO received 20,827 
complaints.7 
While clearly very different in scale – the FOS is the biggest ombudsman in Europe8, 
and possibly the world – both organizations deal with very similar types of problems, are 
governed by the same European legislation, and use procedures that are, generally speaking, 
also very similar. At first contact, via telephone, letter or online, the consumer is asked a 
series of questions to decide if her case is admissible. An assessment team or case handlers 
identify cases that can be resolved without a full investigation, and those that have to be 
escalated through the complaints process. Most cases are resolved at an early stage, and only a 
few go through to a full investigation and receive a concluding adjudication by the 
ombudsman. While the outcome is binding on the financial service providers, consumers can 
still resort to a court. 
FORMING JUDGMENTS ABOUT OMBUDSMEN
There is now a considerable amount of evidence suggesting that when forming judgements of 
authority figures in legal contexts, such as policing and the criminal courts, the effects of 
procedural justice – concerns about the quality of formal and informal decision-making 
processes, and about the quality of formal and informal personal treatment9  – outweigh those 
of distributive fairness and outcome favourability.10 People tend to care more, that is, about 
the fairness of the process than about the outcome it delivers.  What is less clear, however, is 
how these different elements, procedural justice as well as outcome-related concerns, come 
together in ‘quasi-legal’ settings such as ombudsmen to shape overall perceptions of fairness 
7
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4and outcome acceptance.11 More precisely: how does the idea of procedural justice translate 
into the context of a financial service dispute, in which money is the main driver? Moreover, 
research on the dynamics of procedural justice has often lacked a clear cross-cultural 
comparative element – although there are of course exceptions, including Kim and Leung in 
the organizational literature12, and Staubli and Jackson and colleagues in the criminological 
literature.13 One possible reason for this is that different legal, social and political regimes 
can often seem to make such comparisons difficult. It can be difficult to explore cross-
cultural perspectives on what constitutes ‘fair process’ when the processes involved are 
themselves often culturally contingent.
While Germany and the UK have very different legal histories and cultures14, the 
individuals in our sample had all gone through a very similar process – making a complaint 
about a financial service provider to ombudsman services overseen by the same EU 
legislation. Our data therefore allow us to explore not only how people in Germany and the 
UK experienced this process, and how their overall judgments about it came together, but 
also to make some tentative inferences about the extent to which differential legal 
socialization, within dissimilar legal cultures, might shape their justice-related concerns and 
thus the ways they experience and understand this form of dispute resolution.
1. Procedural justice in ADR
To date, procedural justice research concerned with legal processes has concentrated 
primarily on policing and criminal justice (although procedural justice effects have been 
identified in a very wide range of settings, from parent-child relations to employment15). 
Ombudsman services therefore provide a relatively unexplored legal context for exploring 
questions of procedural justice.
The differences between a financial service ADR procedure and a formal court 
hearing, or an interaction between police officer and member of the public, are, in their very 
11
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5basic nature, threefold. First, this is for most people a novel legal context, and expectations of 
it are unlikely to be influenced by personal, vicarious or mediated experience of the same or 
similar processes. Second, there is typically no legal representative that manages expectations 
and guides an individual through the process (indeed there might be no identifiable human 
figure, akin to a police officer or court official, involved at all). Third, and relatedly, the 
process is usually managed entirely via telephone and online, with hardly any face-to-face 
interaction. It seems plausible to suggest that these factors will have an effect on the justice 
perceptions of people going through the ADR process, and we turn first to the extant 
literature on this issue.
a. When is a legal process fair and acceptable?
For decades, research has considered the question of what makes legal processes fair and 
acceptable to those involved. Two distinct components are commonly identified. First there 
are outcome-related concerns. On this account, people who have been involved in a legal 
process or procedure ask themselves “did I get the outcome I wanted” (outcome 
favourability) and/or “do I think I received the same outcome as others in my situation” 
(perceptions of equal treatment). If the answers to these questions are positive they are likely 
to: feel that the process concerned was itself fair and appropriate; be satisfied with both it and 
the decision maker; be willing to accept the decision reached; and be more likely to obey the 
(future) instructions of the authority figure and the institution they represent.16 
Second are process-related concerns. Here, the argument is that assessments of legal 
processes and decision-makers (and indeed many other formal and informal processes and 
decision-makers, e.g. in the workplace) are not driven by outcomes but by the nature of the 
procedures themselves and, in particular, the process of interaction with the decision-maker. 
Research across a wide variety of contexts has shown that ‘procedural justice’ is a more 
important predictor of outcomes such as those outlined above than either outcome 
favourability or perceptions of equal treatment.17 
16
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concept. On the one hand, specific behaviours on the part of authorities are categorized, with 
a particular focus on: offering participation or voice, behaving neutrality, treating people with 
dignity and respect, and displaying trustworthy motives.18 Research finds that people’s 
perceptions of the behaviour of authority figures and decision-makers across these criteria 
tends to collapse into a general sense of procedurally fair (or unfair) treatment – they do not 
distinguish between these different components but rather take a general position on the 
encounter as whole.
Other research distinguishes between the ‘quality of decision-making’ and the 
‘quality of treatment’19, with a further distinction sometimes drawn between formal and 
informal levels (i.e. those relating to codified rules and procedures and those relating to the 
quality of interpersonal interaction and the behaviour of individuals20). Quality of decision-
making refers primarily to openness, consistency, neutrality and a lack of bias – the ability to 
make the right decision), while quality of interaction relates primarily to issues of respect, 
dignity, voice and trustworthiness, and therefore to the good intentions and ‘quality’ of the 
decision-maker.
We follow the latter approach in this paper. Limiting analysis to the informal level21, 
we do so primarily because these do appear to be distinct aspects of people’s experiences22, 
which may have practical and policy implications. It may be useful for a legal or other 
authority to know whether people using its services place particular importance on the way 
they are treated by staff, for example. However, we also note that in the current context there 
is likely to be a close relationship between these different components of procedural justice. 
There are two complementary reasons for suggesting why this might be the case. First, the 
unfamiliarity of the ombudsman process may create uncertainty about even informal 
of social exchange and affect-based perspectives’ [2013] Journal of Applied Psychology 199; Kate Murphy, 
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7decision-making processes, because for example complainants lack the knowledge to form 
expectations about how decisions should be reached. They may thus make inferences about 
the nature of decision-making from something they do have experience with – the quality of 
the personal interaction between themselves the people working at the ombudsman service. 
This is therefore a version of the justice substitutability process described by Van den Bos 
and colleagues23; the idea that people use aspects of a process about which they do have 
knowledge as heuristics for aspects of the process of which they have little or no knowledge. 
Second, since most of the interactions represented in our data will have occurred entirely in 
writing, on-line and over the telephone, decision-making processes will likely have been even 
more opaque to the individual concerned than might otherwise have been the case. When 
judging the quality of decision-making, this may lead, again, to inference from the quality of 
interaction. We therefore expect a strong correlation between these two components of 
procedural justice.
b. What explains the pre-eminence of procedural justice concerns?
Why then should procedural justice be more important than outcome-related concerns when 
it comes to predicting overall fairness judgements, decision-acceptance and other outcomes? 
There are three common, inter-related and mutually compatible answers to this question, all 
of which have implications for the ombudsman context.
The first answer revolves around a cognitive account of the normativity of fairness. 
Here, people evaluate the behaviour of authority figures against commonly held norms 
concerning how power-holders should behave24 – when such behaviour is found to be fair, 
they reward those authorities with obedience and support. One way to envisage this process is 
therefore via a version of Social Exchange Theory.25 Two parties involved in an exchange 
follow a specific set of rules that provide a ‘normative definition of the situation’26, and when 
one party abides by these rules the other feels normative pressure to do the same. The 
procedural justice literature suggests that in many contexts norms concerning process fairness 
are likely to loom large in such considerations. 
23
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8It is here, however, that the potential for cross-cultural variation comes into focus. 
Norms of fairness, and the extent to which they activate reciprocal behaviour, may vary 
across jurisdictions. Different cultures generate different normative expectations concerning 
appropriate behaviour, and embrace different ‘systems of values’27 that influence the 
relationships people form with legal institutions: legal culture is a “socially derived product 
encompassing such interrelated concepts as legitimacy and acceptance of authorities, 
preferences for and beliefs about dispute arrangements, and authorities' use of discretionary 
power”.28
For the purpose of this paper we understand legal culture, functioning at a national 
level, to be an informing and driving force in people’s relationships with authorities. These 
relationships are founded in a particular set of values and attitudes, inculcated via legal 
socialization, which provide the social and cultural tools people use to make sense of their 
experiences.29 Legal culture(s) may help explain how ordinary people come to their 
assessments of the decisions reached and procedures used by an ombudsman. There is much 
to suggest that people socialized in different legal systems will place more or less emphasis 
on particular aspects of a process – and/or its outcomes – in ways that reflect the norms of the 
particular legal culture within which they are embedded.30
The attitudes framed by different legal cultures, and the norms and values upon which 
they are founded, may provide heuristics for those socialized within them when they are 
confronted by a novel procedure such as ADR. In particular, civil law systems inculcate 
norms concerning consensus and deference to the decisions of properly constituted authority, 
while common law systems promote a more adversarial and hence transactional viewpoint, 
which is both more alive to the idea that decision-makers can be challenged and places greater 
emphasis on their role as a neutral arbiter. We therefore expect, first, that German respondents 
will, assuming they believe the ombudsman authority is properly constituted, place relatively 
less emphasis on procedural justice, because German legal culture emphasizes the form of 
authority and the correctness of decisions. As it happens, the German insurance ombudsman 
is a retired judge, which gives him a ‘legal authority’ within a process that is explicitly 
27
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9positioned as an alternative to a court based process. In addition, all of his staff are lawyers 
and the procedural language used in communicating with the public is very formal and 
legalistic. This may increase the resonance between this form of ADR and more explicitly 
formal legal processes, and enhance the extent to which ‘cultural’ knowledge of the latter acts 
as a heuristic for the former. By contrast, UK respondents should place relatively more 
emphasis on procedural justice, because they have a higher expectation of voice from legal 
processes and because they expect decision-makers to be neutral. Second, and symmetrically, 
while we suggest below that in the ADR context most participants will be more outcome 
focused than seems to be the case in other legal contexts, the focus in civil law jurisdictions 
on the correctness of decisions reached by power-holders should make German respondents 
(even) more focused on the outcome than their British counterparts.
The second answer to the question as to why fairness judgements are so important for 
outcomes such as decision acceptance relates to perceptions of process control and the 
subjective reduction in uncertainty associated with a sense of procedural justice. When an 
individual feels that decisions have been reached in a fair, balanced and neutral fashion, when 
they have ‘had their say’, and when they trust the decision-maker, they may be more 
confident that the right decision was made and that it was arrived at appropriately, even if 
they are unclear as to its implications, are unsure how exactly it was reached and/or it went 
against them.31 This idea seems particularly salient in the current context, given the relative 
novelty, and as we describe below opacity, of ombudsmen services to many of those using 
them.
The third potential reason for observed associations between fairness judgements and 
outcomes such as decision acceptance relates to the relational aspects of procedural justice. 
Here, the argument is that authority figures such as police officers, judges, and employers are 
important representatives of social groups to which those interacting with them (as suspects, 
victims, appellants or employees) feel a sense of affiliation. This makes the behaviour of the 
authority ‘identity relevant’ to the individual and, in particular, the extent to which they feel 
procedurally fairly treated provides them with important information about their inclusion, 
status and worth within this group. Feeling that one belongs, and is recognized as belonging, 
31
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by group authorities motivates one to trust them on the basis of shared group membership, 
accept their decisions, and indeed legitimize the institutional framework within which they 
are operating.32 
This explanation seems prima facie less likely to hold in the ombudsman context, for 
the simple reason that it is unclear whether the figure of the ombudsman carries the same 
affective charge as that of the police officer, judge or even employer. It is far from certain 
that the ombudsman is a ‘proto-typical group representative’33 in the same way as these other 
figures can be. While identity processes certainly cannot be ruled out in this context, we 
therefore rely in this paper on the first two explanations of procedural justice effects outlined 
above.
2. The ombudsman process 
There are other reasons to suggest that some of the most commonly identified aspects of 
procedural justice theory will be altered in the ombudsman context. Can, for example, core 
aspects of procedural justice such as voice and respect be provided via telephone and 
particularly via online interaction? Previous research has called this into question. Balmer et 
al34, for example, found that at the most basic level people are generally more satisfied with 
an interaction on the phone than online. Wells35 went one step further to consider perceptions 
of fairness where there was no human interaction at all – and found that people caught 
speeding by automated camera systems often experienced the process as unfair and unjust. 
She argues that while the ‘techno-fix’ provided by speed cameras
“is guaranteed to be fair in one sense [since it is always ‘right’] … a machine is unable to 
demonstrate respect, respond politely or provide the ears necessary for an individual to feel that 
their voice has been heard. [T]hese additional criteria implicitly necessitate the involvement of 
human beings in procedurally just encounters” (p. 801). 
32
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Although the ombudsman context offers some form of interpersonal interaction, the bulk of 
this does not happen in real-time.36 The process is largely mediated through a virtual platform 
that does not allow immediate responses and which may have an impact on the experience of 
interpersonal treatment and perceptions of the quality of decision-making.
The nature and role of the human actors involved in the ombudsman process also 
differs from those in more ‘traditional’ legal contexts. An encounter with a police officer or 
judge is an interaction seeped in the authority and power that attaches to these institutions. 
The individual is not only subordinate to these figures but is at substantial risk of their 
potential malfeasance. It is not surprising that in such situations people want the power-
holder to make fair, unbiased and neutral decisions. An ombudsman process, on the other 
hand, may involve other types of relationships, generating different sets of expectations. The 
ombudsman is certainly an authority, but one that has been established to protect the 
consumer and help them negotiate their complaints with companies. An individual 
approaches an ombudsman to seek help in addressing a problem they have with a business (a 
financial service provider, for example). They may be supplicants, but they are less clearly 
subordinates. And the worst that can come of the interaction is that the case is not found in 
their favour – the extent to which the ombudsman can actively do them harm, by omission or 
commission, is far less than is the case when, for example, a person is arrested by the police. 
The issue of neutrality, for example, may therefore be less salient when people are dealing 
with ombudsmen.
Yet, despite this, and despite what does seem to be a stronger emphasis on outcome 
favourability among ADR service-users compared with people involved in criminal justice 
contexts, procedural justice concerns still appear important. In a recent paper we explored 
whether procedural justice could explain, as it does in other contexts, why people accept 
decisions handed down by ombudsmen.37 We found that outcome favourability and 
procedural justice both shaped decision acceptance; however, outcome favourability has a 
more important weighting in this context than is often the case in other studies, for example 
of policing. We concluded that while staff procedural justice did have a significant statistical 
effect on people’s overall perceptions of fairness of the ombudsmen, and therefore on 
decision acceptance (marking a similarity with other more overtly ‘legal’ contexts), it may 
simply be that in the ombudsman context people are more outcome-focused than seems to be 
36
 Naomi Creutzfeldt, Ombudsmen and ADR: A comparative study of informal justice in Europe (palgrave 
Macmillan 2018)
37
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the case elsewhere (which is not to claim that people being dealt with by police and courts do 
not care about outcomes, too).
Based on our previous findings within one country, we take the inquiry to a 
specifically regulated context and across countries. For this purpose, we formulate the 
following five hypotheses.
3. Hypotheses 
H1 is that, as in many previous studies, procedural justice (measured as quality of 
treatment and quality of decision-making) will be an important predictor of overall 
assessments of fairness, confidence in the decision-maker, and decision acceptance. H2, 
however, is that outcome related concerns will also be important.
H3 is that procedural justice will be more important a predictor of confidence in the 
decision-maker and outcome acceptance for UK compared with German residents. H4 is that, 
contrariwise, outcome favourability will be more important to German residents. Finally, H5 
is that perceptions of equal treatment, as an outcome related concern, will similarly be more 
important in Germany than in the UK.
DATA, CONTEXT, AND MEASURES
The survey used here was fielded in 2014/15. It was specifically designed by the authors to 
gauge views of ombudsman services in cross-cultural context (in France38, Germany and the 
UK). To preserve users’ anonymity, the ombudsmen themselves sent out surveys between 
September 2014 and February 2015. The total number of responses from the three countries 
was just over 3,000.  For this paper we are looking at the responses from the VO (n= 519) in 
Germany and the FOS in the UK (n= 196).39
Sampling was complicated by the nature of the complaints processes involved and the 
views and practices of the ombudsmen. The VO sent out 1,500 paper forms to individuals 
who had (a) had significant interaction with the ombudsman concerning their complaint (i.e. 
excluding those whose initial enquiries were dealt with very quickly – typically those who 
turned to the ombudsman before they contacted the company they are complaining about) 
and (b) whose case had recently been finalized (i.e. the ombudsman had made a 
recommendation or decision). Essentially all those who met these criteria were contacted, and 
38
 The French database only consisted of telecoms and energy ombudsmen user data.
39
 The data was collected as part of an ESRC funded project [grant number ES/K00820X/01] and can be found 
in the ESRC data repository.
13
the response rate was 35 per cent. Over the same period, the FOS ran two large online 
customer satisfaction surveys as part of their own regular consumer feedback process 
(n=22,924). Criteria for inclusion were consumers who had been through their complaints 
procedure: the FOS has to collect user data as part of the reporting requirements to the 
regulator (FCA40) and for publication in their annual reports.41 After each survey was 
completed, a random sample of those who had taken part and who had indicated a 
willingness to engage in further research were re-contacted to ask if they would participate in 
the current study; n=1,334.  Links to an on-line survey were emailed to those who responded 
positively (n=343), 196 responded, resulting in a response rate of 15 per cent based on first 
contact and 57 per cent based on links provided. Neither sample was therefore a random 
probability sample, although within the criteria set the VO method is likely to have resulted 
in greater representativeness than the FOS method.
1. Response variables
Three response variables were used to capture respondents’ judgements about the complaint 
process.42 Descriptive statistics for all three can be found in Table 1. First, overall 
assessments of the fairness of the process (Overall fairness) were gauged using a single 
survey item that asked “how fair are the procedures the ombudsmen used to make the 
decision in their case”; responses were on a five-point scale ranging from ‘very fair’ to ‘very 
unfair’
Second, respondents’ confidence in the ombudsman service at the end of the process 
(Confidence) was also measured by a single survey item, which read “I have confidence in 
the ombudsman”. Responses were on a five-point scale ranging from ‘yes’, ‘very likely’, ‘not 
sure’, ‘probably not’, to ‘no’.
Third, to assess respondents’ sense that they were willing to accept the decision 
reached (Outcome acceptance), a single item measure was taken from a survey question that 
asked “Were you willing to accept the outcome?”. Responses were on a five-category scale 
ranging from ‘Very willing’ to ‘Very unwilling’. Remarkably, not a single German 
respondent indicated one of the intermediate responses (‘fairly willing’ or ‘fairly unwilling’). 






 We had to negotiate the content of the surveys with the ombudsmen involved, that inevitably meant some 
compromise. Therefore, we chose to have some independent variables measured at dichotomous level and 
others at scale level.
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decision of an authority or not, or indicates that one is unwilling to go either way at the 
present point in time – one cannot partially accept such a decision (UK respondents appeared 
happy to tick the intermediate categories).  Responses on this item were therefore collapsed 
to generate a new binary variable, outcome acceptance, coded one if the respondent indicated 
they were ‘very’ or ‘fairly willing’ to accept the outcome and zero if they were ‘neither 
willing or unwilling’, ‘fairly unwilling’ or ‘very unwilling’. 
Table 1 near here
2. Explanatory variables
Descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables are shown in Table 1. Two scales 
represented respondents’ perception of Ombudsman procedural justice: Quality of treatment; 
and Quality of decision-making. The first scale was derived from four items (with binary 
yes/no response categories) probing how respondents felt they were treated by the staff they 
initially dealt with at the Ombudsman service, while the second was derived from five items 
exploring perceptions of the way Ombudsman staff made decisions (responses were on 5-
point agree/disagree scales). Item wordings are shown in Table 2.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in the statistical package Mplus 7.2 was used to 
derive and validate these measures.43 CFA is a statistical technique that, among other things, 
allows one to understand the ‘dimensionality’ of a set of survey questions, i.e. the extent to 
which variation in answers to a particular set of items is explained by one or more underlying 
‘latent’ variable or factor.44 Latent variables are so called because they are not observed, but 
are rather inferred from the effect they exert on variables that are observed (i.e. the survey 
items). CFA allows estimation of the form and content of these latent variables, and has many 
desirable features, such as reduction in the measurement error associated with single survey 
items.
To deal with the issue of measurement equivalence – with the question as to whether 
the latent constructs of interest, treatment and decision-making, were similar in nature across 
the German and UK contexts – the following procedure was applied. First, a multiple group 
CFA model was estimated, which specified a two-factor solution with no cross-loadings, and 
which constrained factor loadings and thresholds of the observed indicators equal across the 
43
  Using Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation means that cases with some missing values were not 
dropped from the analysis.
44
 Barbara Byrne, Structural Equation Modelling with Mplus (Routledge 2012)
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two groups (i.e. Germany and the UK). Observed indicators were defined as categorical, 
while the latent variables were set as interval/ratio. Results from this model are shown in 
Table 2. Model fit was good, according to the approximate fit indices (RMSEA = .03; TLI = 
.99; CFI = .99), and item R2 values are almost uniformly high (and above .4 in every case). 
Next, similar models which allowed first the factor loadings, and second the thresholds, to 
vary across the two groups were estimated. These did not improve model fit according to the 
exact fit statistics; there was also little change in the approximate fit statistics. Group 
invariance in factor loadings and thresholds is generally considered sufficient to assume 
measurement equivalence in the social sciences45, and we therefore extracted factors scores 
from the model shown in Table 2 for further analysis. Note that, as expected, the two 
measures of procedural justice where highly correlated (r=.79). However, a model that 
combined both into one construct was a significantly worse fit to the data, so we decided to 
continue with the two as separate indicators. A correlation of .79 is also just below the 
conventional cut-off point used to identify poor discriminant validity (.80)
Single item indicators were used to assess respondent’s judgements of other aspects 
of the process. While multiple-item scales would perhaps have been preferable here, too, we 
had limited space for items in the survey, and in any case the use of single items does at least 
provide a pragmatic answer to the question of measurement equivalence. First, a survey item 
that asked whether the outcome of the case was, in the respondent’s view, decided in their 
favour was included as a binary indicator (Outcome favourability). This measure was coded 1 
if a respondent felt the outcome was favourable to them, and 0 if they felt it was not, it was 
only partially in their favour, or were unsure. A second binary indicator (perceptions of equal 
treatment) was derived from an item that asked “Do you think that others with a similar 
complaint to yours receive the same outcome from the ombudsman?”. Responses were on a 
five point Likert-type scale, and were coded to 1 if the respondent felt that others would get 
the same outcome, or were likely to, and 0 if they were not sure or felt that others would not 
get the same outcome as themselves. 
3. A note on control variables
We have not included socio-demographic control variables in our models for the simple 
reason that the German ombudsman refused to include such measures in the survey. Unlike in 
the UK, such questions are not common in German surveys. However, few consistent 
45Linda Muthén and Bengt Muthén, Mplus User’s Guide 7th Edition (2012 Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & 
Muthén) 
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associations between socio-demographic variables and key measures have been identified in 
the procedural justice literature46, and many psychologically oriented contributions largely 
ignore such factors.47 Omission of control variables is therefore unlikely to have introduced 
significant bias to our analysis, at least in comparison to other extant research. We did, of 
course, include a dummy variable in each model representing the country of the respondent 
concerned (coded 1 it was Germany and O if it was the UK); we also controlled for how the 
respondent initiated contact (in a letter, online, or by telephone).
4. Analytic strategy
To assess the relative contributions of procedural justice, perceptions of equal treatment and 
outcome favourability to overall fairness judgements, trust in the ombudsman, and decision 
acceptance, a series of regression models was estimated for each outcome variable. The first 
included the country indicator, method of contact, perceptions of equal treatment, outcome 
favourability and two components of procedural justice. Subsequent models tested 
interactions between country and the other explanatory variables, to explore the key question 
of whether the association between process judgements and outcomes varied between 
Germany and the UK.
RESULTS
An important initial question is whether attitudes toward the ombudsman and the ADR 
process varied between Germany and the UK. The column marked ‘Sig. Diff.’ in Table 1 
indicates whether there was a significant difference in views across service users in the two 
countries (assessed via t-tests or z-tests, as appropriate). Considering first specific process- 
and outcome-related concerns, views were generally more favourable in the UK. Users of the 
UK service scored higher on both measures of procedural justice, and on outcome 
favourability, while users of the German service scored higher on perceptions of equal 
treatment. By contrast, summary assessments of the ombudsman were uniformly more 
positive in Germany, where respondents tended to have a better impression of overall 
fairness, trusted more, and were more ready to accept the outcome. These findings are 
intriguing, as they suggest that respondents in Germany tended to be less positive about the 
46
 Compare for example: Michael Reisig, Jason Bratton, Marc Gertz, ‘The Construct Validity and Refinement of 
Process-Based Policing Measures’ [2007] Criminal Justice and Behavior 1005; Justice Tankebe, ‘Viewing 
things differently: the dimensions of public perceptions of legitimacy’ [2013] Criminology 103; see Jackson et 
al (n 17)
47
 See: Tyler (n 17)
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ombudsman process but have more positive overall views of the authority – a point we return 
to below.
Table 3 near here
Table 3 shows results from a series of ordinal logistic regression models predicting 
assessments of overall fairness. We find, first, positive conditional correlations between the 
response variable and perceptions of procedural justice, perceptions of equal treatment and 
outcome favourability. It seems that judgements about the overall fairness of the ombudsman 
process among service users are ‘built up’ from a range of factors, and are not dominated by 
procedural justice concerns alone. Second, it is the quality of decision-making that appears to 
be the most important component of procedural justice – in fact, given the latter, the 
coefficient for personal treatment became negative and verged on significance at the 
‘conventional’ level (p<.1), a seemingly anomalous result that probably reflects little more 
than the high correlation between the two procedural justice measures. Note, though, that in 
models that excluded quality of decision making, not shown here, quality of treatment was 
positively correlated with assessments of overall fairness. Third, none of the interaction terms 
tested were significant at conventional levels (p>.1 in every case) – the association between 
all four explanatory variables and overall fairness was similar in Germany and the UK. 
Fourth, and finally, the coefficient for the country variable was significant and positive 
throughout. Holding constant concerns about process fairness and outcome favourability, 
German respondents tended to have more positive views of the overall fairness of the 
ombudsman than their UK counterparts. The extent of the difference can be illustrated by 
fitted probabilities generated from model 1 in Table 3 – holding all other variable constant (at 
their mean), the probability of a German respondent indicating they thought the process 
overall was fair was .66 – for UK respondents it was .56.
Table 4 near here
Moving on to confidence in the Ombudsman, Table 4 shows results from a second 
series of ordinal logistic regression models predicting this outcome variable. The results are 
strikingly similar to those outlined above. Positive conditional correlations between the 
response variable and perceptions of procedural justice, perceptions of equal treatment and 
outcome favourability were again identified; all three seemed to contribute to overall 
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confidence. Quality of decision-making again seemed to be the dominant aspect of 
procedural justice (although absent quality of decision-making, quality of treatment was 
positively correlated with confidence). And the coefficient for the country variable was again 
significant and positive throughout. Holding constant the other variables in the model, 
German respondents tended to have more confidence in the ombudsman than their UK 
counterparts. Fitted probabilities from model 1 in Table 4 again illustrate the extent of the 
difference – with all other variables again held at their mean, the probability of a German 
respondent indicating confidence in the ombudsman was .73, while for UK respondents it 
was .57.
One difference from the previous models, however, is that two of the interaction 
terms tested verged on significance at conventional levels (i.e. p<.1). There is some evidence 
to suggest that perceptions of equal treatment tended to a more important predictor of trust 
among German respondents, while against expectations judgements about outcome 
favourability tended to be a less important predictor. 
Table 5 near here
Finally, Table 5 shows results from a series of binary logistic regression models 
predicting outcome acceptance. Because almost all respondents (99 per cent) who indicated 
that they received a favourable outcome said they were ready to accept it, only those who 
indicated an unfavourable or mixed outcome are included in this model. In this particular 
context, and presumably many others, people are unsurprisingly very ready to accept 
decisions that are in their favour even if, as we saw above, outcome favourability did not 
dominate perceptions of the process or and confidence in the decision-maker.
The results in Table 5 are consistent with previous models. Respondents who felt 
procedurally and distributively fairly treated were more likely to accept the outcome of their 
case (even though it was not favourable to them). Quality of decision-making was be the 
dominant aspect of procedural justice (and absent quality of decision-making, quality of 
treatment was positively correlated with outcome acceptance). None of the interaction terms 
tested were significant – the association between all four explanatory variables and outcome 
acceptance was similar in Germany and the UK. Finally, the coefficient for the country 
variable was significant and positive throughout. Holding constant fairness concerns, German 
respondents tended to report greater willingness to accept the Ombudsman decision than their 
UK counterparts. The extent of the difference can again be illustrated by fitted probabilities, 
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generated this time from model 1 in Table 5. With other variables held at their mean, the 
probability of a German respondent indicating they were ready to accept the outcome was .45 
– for UK respondents it was .26.
DISCUSSION
Returning to the five hypotheses that motivated our analysis we found, then, strong support 
for H1 and H2 – procedural justice was a strong predictor of all three outcome variables 
tested, but so was outcome favourability. Our remaining hypotheses were not supported by 
the data, however. We found little or no evidence that procedural justice was more important 
to UK compared with German respondents (H3), or that the outcome or perceptions of equal 
treatment were more important to the German compared with the UK respondents (H4 and 
H5). It seems that across these different legal contexts people place a broadly similar weight 
on process and outcome related factors when forming their overall view of the ADR 
procedure. 
Our models also threw up a very consistent and arguably unexpected finding. 
Conditioning on process- and outcome-related concerns, German respondents were more 
likely to judge the overall process fair, more likely to have confidence in the ombudsman 
service, and more likely to accept unfavourable decisions. Independent of judgements about 
the nature and quality of the process, German respondents were more positive about and 
more acquiescent toward the authority managing that process. The extent of this statistical 
effect was often quite large – for example, given the same perception of procedural and 
perceptions of equal treatment, a German respondent was nearly twice as likely to accept an 
unfavourable decision as a UK respondent.
In sum, our original general hypothesis that the relative weight of justice concerns 
would vary between Germany and the UK was not supported. But there remained important 
differences between the two sets of respondents in terms of overall views of the ombudsmen. 
This leads to two connected conclusions, one about procedural justice and the other about 
national context. First, this study adds to the general thrust of the procedural justice literature, 
which is that (broadly the same) procedural justice concerns are important to people across 
multiple jurisdictions and cultural contexts. Yet, second, our data add some nuance to this 
general picture, and suggest that national context also plays a role. Holding constant justice 
related concerns, German respondents had consistently more positive views of the 
ombudsman.
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This second conclusion, we suggest, indicates that attitudes toward this particular 
legal authority are embedded in culturally mediated orientations towards legal authority in 
general. A number of authors have argued that socialization in the German legal system 
predisposes people toward a greater willingness to accept and validate structures of 
authority.48 In ideal-typical terms, the ‘cultural form’49 of legal process in Germany continues 
to be one of deference toward properly constituted authority, while in the UK it has taken on 
a form of de-subordination.50 Milliband51 described, in the late 70s, a phenomenon that has 
arguably continued to this day. ‘De-subordination’ implies that people who find themselves 
in subordinate positions are increasingly prepared to do what they can to ‘mitigate, resist and 
transform the conditions of their subordination’ (p. 402), fostering a desire for voice in the 
face of authority, face-to-face interaction, and the questioning of authority. Hofstede52 argues 
cultural forms find their articulation in the social behaviour of human actors – people develop 
ways to think about and relate to authorities within a particular (in this case national) culture. 
This includes forming opinions and understandings about how authority figures should 
function in institutional settings (and it seems procedural justice is consistently one such 
norm). But it also involves understandings about what is the proper relationship with 
authorities, which shapes interactions with authorities and the ways in which people react to 
them. What we are picking up in this data, then, may be that the UK respondents were simply 
more willing to dispute and question the decisions handed down, and were generally more 
sceptical about the ADR process, because they had a different idea about how people should 
relate to legal authority.
This is of course a contingent process: our claim is simply that it just so happens in 
this case that these cultural norms promote greater acceptance of the ombudsman and its 
decisions among the Germans in our sample. It could well be that in other circumstances 
different norms might have promoted less acceptance among the German respondents, or 
some other set of responses entirely. But based on our reading of German legal culture, we 
argue that a German service user will be more likely to follow an ombudsman decision if 
they feel that decision came from an authority that is part of a hierarchical structure. As noted 
48see Blankenburg (n 14); Oscar G. Chase, ‘Legal Processes and National Culture’ [1997] 5 CARDOZO J. 
INT'L & CaMP L1; Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, 
Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations (Sage 2001); Nicola Lacey & Lucia Zedner, 
‘Community in German Criminal Justice: a Significant Absence?’ [1998] SLS 7
49
 Cliffort Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books Inc. 1973)
50
 Following a similar argument see: R. Reiner, ‘Policing a Postmodern Society’ [1992] MLR 761; Ian Loader 
and Aogan Mulcahy, Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture (OUP 2003)
51
 R. Miliband. ‘A State of De-Subordination’ [1978] The British Journal of Sociology 399
52
 see Hofstede (n 49)
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the German ombudsman ‘fits’ this pattern, and perhaps, therefore, with people’s normative 
expectations of authority, thus producing the generally more accepting and positive views of 
our German respondents. By contrast, the generally abstract and mediated nature of the 
ombudsman process may have been contrary to the expectations of the British respondents, 
brought up as they were in a legal culture that prioritizes the idea of ‘having one’s day in 
court’ and the importance of being able to question authority and its decisions. 
A further important contextual issue in relation to FOS is the political context 
surrounding financial services organizations and mis-selling scandals. The FOS deals with 
one of the most competitive and aggressive financial B2C markets in Europe. Financial mis-
selling has been a politically salient issue for many years. Financial complaints, certainly in 
relation to complaints that the FOS was dealing with at the time of research, are not one-off 
incidents, but part of a large-scale scandal. There is also an institutionalized industry of semi-
legal firms that specialize in submission of financial complaints to firms and the FOS, which 
publicize their success in achieving redress for complainants. Consequently, consumers in the 
UK may approach the FOS with greater confidence that they should and are in fact likely to 
succeed, and are therefore more disappointed if their complaint is rejected. What is more, 
British consumers’ general distrust towards the financial industry in the UK may extend to 
the FOS. 
Absent a much fuller evaluation of people’s experiences of these two ombudsman 
services the above remains, of course, conjecture. It may well be that the observed 
differences between the German and UK respondents were not due to differing orientations 
toward authority, or the public scandal in the UK, but rather some variation between the 
services provided in the two contexts. Or perhaps the different sampling methods generated 
samples that differed substantively on some important, unobserved, variable. In our defence, 
the idea that process- and outcome-related concerns together dominate people’s overall 
perceptions of particular legal procedures is well-established, and our models included 
variables that covered procedural justice, perceptions of equal treatment and outcome 
favourability. The country-level statistical effect identified above, independent of these 
fairness and outcome concerns, is therefore striking; but much more work will be needed to 
explore these questions.
A further limitation of our study is that it relies on cross-sectional data generated by 
non-random sampling. Given the paucity of research on ombudsman services, though, we 
feel that our survey in this hitherto largely unexplored area is a useful place to start, and will 
hopefully provide, again, a springboard for future research. 
22
Finally, we note that of the two measures of procedural justice used in this study it 
was quality of decision-making that seemed to the more important, albeit that the two were 
strongly correlated. This may relate, at least in part, to the idea that fair decision-making 
processes lead people to believe the right decisions are being made, which they should in turn 
accept. Yet, we suggested above that the extent of the correlation between the two 
components of procedural justice may be due in part to inferences being made from quality of 
treatment (of which respondents had direct experience) to quality of decision-making (of 
which they may have had very little direct experience). The relationship between these two 
aspects of procedural justice, as predictors of various outcomes, may thus warrant further 
investigation, particularly in contexts such as ADR were people might be expected to be 
more certain about one compared to the other. We might suppose, for example, that there is 
an indirect effect of quality of treatment on outcomes, mediated by quality of decision-
making.
CONCLUSION
This paper considered ombudsman providing consumer ADR. It adds to the extant literature 
on procedural justice, offering more support to the idea that procedural justice effects can be 
identified across multiple social, political and cultural contexts. Both German and UK 
respondents in our sample seemed on average to attend closely to the fairness of the 
procedures used by ‘their’ ombudsmen. Yet, our findings also push that literature in new 
directions. Unlike in some other legal contexts, users of ombudsman services in both 
Germany and the UK were closely attuned to the outcome they received, and to the idea of 
equal treatment. Further, while the nature of our data means we have only hints of the wider 
processes involved, we suggest that national legal cultures provide for a framework of rules 
that guide people’s perceptions and behaviours in legal, quasi-legal and related environments. 
The formally structured way of disputing that is encoded in legal cultures teaches us how we 
are expected to relate to authorities within such settings; and legal culture is therefore one of 
the sources that we draw upon when encountering a legal process (or figure) like an 
ombudsman. The limited evidence we have presented here suggests that the effects of legal 
culture run alongside the more commonly studied phenomena of procedural justice. 
This may have important consequences. One factor motivating ombudsmen to 
participate in our study was a concern that they lack legitimacy among potential client 
groups. If our speculation above is correct, the ombudsman model in a particular country 
should be implemented in such a way as to tap into culturally rooted expectations about how 
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legal authorities should be constituted and behave.53 Ombudsmen can translate the findings 
into improving their dispute resolution system.54
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
   UK Germany  
 Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Sig. Diff?
Procedural justice
Treatment -3.68 1.98 -0.14 1.66 -0.76 0.84 *
Decision-making -5.37 2.36 -0.17 2.15 -0.53 1.18 *
Perceptions of equal treatment 0 1 0.66 . 0.78 . *
Outcome favourability 0 1 0.51 . 0.40 . *
Fair procedures 1 5 3.65 1.53 3.93 1.15 *
Confidence in ombuds 1 5 3.65 1.63 4.19 1.15 *
Outcome acceptance 0 1 0.62 . 0.68 . +
* p<.05; + p<.1
53
 see Creutzfeldt (n 37)
54
 Jane Williams & Chris Gill, A dispute system design perspective on the future of European consumer dispute 
resolution. In: Cortés, P. (ed.) The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution (OUP 2016)
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TABLE 2
Multi-group CFA model: Procedural justice concerns














What was your impression of the staff when you first contacted (the ombuds)
Helpful 1.00 0.86 0.74 1.00 0.91 0.83
Treated me with respect and courtesy 2.34 0.82 0.68 2.34 0.98 0.96
Seemed trustworthy 0.38 0.80 0.64 0.38 0.65 0.42
Seemed interested in hearing my story 0.59 0.82 0.68 0.59 0.80 0.63
Quality of decision-making
Would you say the people dealing with your complaint …
Always did what they said they would 1.00 0.74 0.55 1.00 0.94 0.87
Had the authority  to deal with your problem 0.66 0.92 0.84 0.66 0.87 0.75
Were easy to get in touch with 0.60 0.73 0.53 0.60 0.85 0.72
Knew what they were talking about 1.70 0.93 0.87 1.70 0.98 0.95






TLI 0.99      
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Table 3
Ordinal logistic regression models predicting judgement of the overall fairness of the procedure
High scores = more fair
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
 ß (se) ß (se) ß (se) ß (se) ß (se)
Country (ref: UK)
Germany 0.79*** 0.95*** 0.92*** 0.45 0.78** 
(0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.31) (0.25)
Mode of first contact (ref: telephone)
Letter or fax 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.19
(0.20) (0.21 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Email or online -0.16 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Other 1.82+ 1.90+ 1.90+ 1.76+ 1.82+  
(1.05) (1.07) (1.06) (1.06) (1.05)
Perceptions of equal treatment (ref: 
no)
Yes 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.33 0.74***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.34) (0.18)
Outcome favourable? (ref: no)
Yes 2.43*** 2.46*** 2.46*** 2.46*** 2.43***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.37)
Quality of treatment -0.22+ -0.31* -0.2 -0.21+ -0.22+  
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Quality of decision-making 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.08*** 1.17*** 1.17***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Interactions
Treatment * country 0.22
(0.16)
Decision-making * country 0.15
(0.13)
Perceptions of equal treatment * 
country 0.57
(0.40)
Outcome favourability * country 0.01
(0.42)
N 709 709 709 709 709
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.00
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Table 4
Ordinal logistic regression models predicting confidence in the ombuds
High scores = more fair)
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
 ß (se) ß (se) ß (se) ß (se) ß (se)
Country (ref: UK)
Germany 1.21*** 1.26*** 1.22*** 0.83** 1.47***
(0.22) (0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27)
Mode of first contact (ref: telephone)
Letter or fax 0.2 0.21 0.2 0.14 0.2
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Email or online -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 -0.08
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Other 1.79 1.81 1.79 1.71 1.8
(1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.26)
Perceptions of equal treatment (ref: 
no)
Yes 0.47* 0.47* 0.47* -0.05 0.47*  
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.37) (0.19)
Outcome favourable? (ref: no)
Yes 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.23*** 1.77***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.39)
Quality of treatment -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Quality of decision-making 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.31*** 1.29***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
Interactions
Treatment * country 0.07
(0.19)
Decision-making * country 0.02
(0.16)
Perceptions of equal treatment * 
country 0.70+
(0.42)
Outcome favourability * country -0.74+  
(0.44)
N 709 709 709 709 709
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 5
Binary logistic regression models predicting willingness to accept outcome
High scores = more fair
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 ß (se) ß (se) ß (se) ß (se)
Country (ref: UK)
Germany 1.13** 1.14** 1.15** 0.49
(0.37) (0.39) (0.39) (0.53)
Mode of first contact (ref: telephone)
Letter or fax -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Email or online 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.16
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Other 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.51
(1.45) (1.46) (1.46) (1.45)
Perceptions of equal treatment (ref: 
no)
Yes 0.79** 0.79** 0.79** -0.13
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.64)
Quality of treatment -0.08 -0.1 -0.08 -0.08
(0.20) (0.26) (0.20) (0.20)
Quality of decision-making 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.89*** 0.93***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.16)
Interactions
Treatment * country 0.02
(0.28)
Decision-making * country 0.04
(0.24)
Perceptions of equal treatment * 
country 1.12
(0.71)
Constant -1.08** -1.09** -1.09** -0.54
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.50)
N 402 402 402 402
+ p<.1 ,* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
